| http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IK06Df03.html
The pervasive
impression is that the impending judgement by the Supreme Court
regarding the propriety of President General Pervez Musharraf's
re-election as president of Pakistan for another term prompted the
timing of his decision to impose emergency rule last week. The temptation
to view the developments in Pakistan through the prism of democracy
is almost irresistible.
But democracy
is not even a sub-theme in the current world of realpolitik in Pakistan.
At best it forms a miniscule part of the story. What emerges beyond
doubt is that Musharraf's move enjoys the support of the top brass
of the Pakistan armed forces. Significantly, he signed the proclamation
on emergency rule in his capacity as the chief of army staff rather
than as the president. He has thereby signaled that the Pakistan
armed forces as a whole are backing his move.
It is on occasions
such as this that the incomprehensible alchemy of the US-Pakistan
relationship fleetingly surfaces. Clearly, it stands to reason that
Musharraf took care to consult Washington and Britain before announcing
his move. But what was the nature of these consultations?
Musharraf spoke
to British Prime Minister Gordon Brown on Thursday, hardly hours
prior to the proclamation of emergency rule. Britain was the prime
mover of the Musharraf-Benazir Bhutto rapprochement. Musharraf kept
in view the need to assuage British feelings.
Equally, Admiral
William Fallon, commander of the US Central Command, was on a visit
to Pakistan, and he actually happened to be in the general headquarters
of the Pakistan armed forces in Rawalpindi when Musharraf was giving
the final touches to his proclamation on emergency rule. The political
symbolism was unmistakable.
US reluctantly
acquiesces
Fallon did his best to
"dissuade" Musharraf from going ahead with his plan, but
had to ultimately give in. Fallon apparently warned Musharraf that
future American aid for his beleaguered regime might be in jeopardy
if the US Congress took a negative view of the rollback of civil
liberties in Pakistan. If so, it is obvious that Fallon failed to
impress the tough Pakistani top brass. Equally, Musharraf estimated
Washington has no choice but to support his regime for the foreseeable
future.
This wouldn't
be the first time that the generals in Rawalpindi have done their
homework as regards their corporate interests and proceeded to set
aside Washington's unsolicited counsel. Time and again in Pakistan's
history it has appeared that the unequal relationship between the
US and Pakistan is far from a one-dimensional tie-up. It would be
a mistake to regard Pakistan as a mindless American proxy - which
is part of the reason why China and Russia have an abiding interest
in that country.
A famous instance
arose when, as the then deputy secretary of state in the Bill Clinton
administration, Strobe Talbott, narrates in his book Engaging India,
his desperate pleas with the Pakistani leadership not to emulate
India in exploding a nuclear device in 1998 were simply ignored
by the Pakistani generals.
A decade earlier,
another Pakistani military strongman, General Zia ul-Haq, simply
refused to toe the US line to agree to an Afghan settlement that
Washington had worked out with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev,
which would have restored Kabul's traditional neutrality in the
geopolitics of the region. Zia insisted Pakistan's influence on
a future regime in Kabul ought to be predominant.
Thus, in retrospect,
it turns out that the former prime minister Bhutto's abrupt departure
for Dubai in the United Arab Emirates last Thursday against the
advice rendered by most of her party leaders happened just in time
when it dawned on the US and Britain that despite their strong urgings,
the generals were hell-bent on the imposition of emergency rule.
The US and Britain counseled her to get out of harm's way and quickly
leave the country.
The initial
statements of "regret" by the Western capitals, especially
Washington, need to be taken with a pinch of salt. To be sure, the
US policy toward Pakistan finds itself in a cul-de-sac. Musharraf's
move coincides almost to the hour with the thundering speech by
President George W Bush at the Heritage Foundation, a Washington-based
think-tank, on Thursday in which he blasted the US Congress for
failing to take his "war on terror" not seriously enough,
and he went on to compare Osama bin Laden to Adolf Hitler and Vladimir
Lenin.
Addressing his
neo-conservative acolytes, Bush came back to his favorite theme
that via his "war on terror", he was actually waging a
global war for democracy and freedom. He compared Islamist "plans
to build a totalitarian Islamist empire ... stretching from Europe
to North Africa, the Middle East and South East Asia" to the
Third Reich. He claimed that US-led campaigns have "liberated
50 million people from the clutches of tyranny" in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Bush said the people in the Middle East are "looking
to the United States to stand up for them".
Alas, we knew
only a day later that just as Bush was speaking, one of his staunchest
allies in his pet global war was squashing democracy and freedom.
The US doublespeak becomes all too apparent in the mildly reproachful
comment over Musharraf's move, bordering on resignation, by the
US spokesmen. It indicates that Washington's dealings with the Musharraf
regime will continue and normal business will resume once the dust
has settled down.
Military
ties intact
The statement by the
Pentagon spokesman is particularly important for the top brass of
the Pakistani armed forces. The spokesman said the development "does
not impact our military support for Pakistan ... Pakistan is a very
important ally in the 'war on terror' and he [Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates] is closely following the fast-moving developments
there".
Traditionally,
it is the opinion of the Pentagon that matters most to the brass
in Rawalpindi - and not the perspectives of the State Department
or readings by the Central Intelligence Agency. As long as the Pentagon's
support remains intact, as is the case presently, Rawalpindi will
be pleased, and Musharraf will continue to enjoy the support of
the corps commanders.
At the moment,
Musharraf is not looking much beyond the endorsement of the emergency
rule by the top brass of the Pakistani armed forces. He doesn't
care for his popularity ratings in Pakistan. And, conceivably, he
wouldn't be particularly flustered by the international reaction
either. Musharraf has assessed that the worsening situation in Afghanistan
leaves the US with hardly much choice in the matter other than working
with the regime that he chooses to head.
Developments
in the western Afghan province of Farah (bordering Iran) and the
southern province of Kandahar have taken a particularly serious
turn lately. The US failed to extract any increased troop commitments
at the recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization defense ministers
meeting. German Chancellor Angela Merkel during her first-ever visit
to Kabul on Saturday flatly refused to deploy German troops in the
volatile southern provinces of Afghanistan. The new government in
Tokyo has cut back on Japan's involvement by stopping refueling
of US ships servicing the war in Afghanistan. The new government
in Poland is reviewing its association with Bush's war.
No need
of US advice
Thus, Musharraf knows
that the US dependence on him is only likely to deepen in the coming
weeks. Besides, Musharraf has succeeded in underscoring in Western
capitals that he is the anchor of "stability" in Pakistan.
No matter the actual ground reality, he has succeeded in projecting
a perceived threat from militants. (The international community
has no independent means of verifying these threat perceptions either.)
To a degree,
even the reaction by New Delhi - a mild statement of "regret"
and a pious hope that "normalcy" will return soon - is
an acknowledgement that Musharraf has maintained an overall climate
of peace and tranquillity as well as a degree of predictability
in relations with India. Western capitals are quite aware of the
extreme fluidity of the situation but are literally forced to suspend
their disbelief in Musharraf's claim as the guardian of Pakistan's
stability. What choice do they have?
In the short
term, therefore, Musharraf doesn't have to look over his shoulder
any more or listen to irritating Western hectoring about democracy
while he goes about resetting the parameters of Pakistan's political
life. He correctly estimates that what matters most is his apparent
willingness to wage a strong military campaign against militants;
his helping hand in advancing an "intra-Afghan dialogue"
involving the Taliban; and his role in the event of Washington deciding
on a military showdown with Iran in the coming months.
In sum, Musharraf
assesses he has a relatively free hand to pressahead with his political
agenda within Pakistan. He must be pretty much fed up with the intrusive
attitude adopted by pretentious US functionaries and think-tanks
in recent months with regard to Pakistan's political future. He
has a point insofar as there aren't any real "Pakistan experts"
as such that the Bush administration could claim to have. His sense
of exasperation was clearly showing in recent weeks that functionaries
in the US administration who have no real grasp of the tough lay
of the land in Pakistan have been dictating to him democracy lessons.
They didn't even understand that one way or another, historically,
Pakistan always remained on the razor's edge while life moved on.
Washington's
insistence that Bhutto should join his team was the proverbial straw
that broke the camel's back. Under tremendous US pressure, Musharraf,
seemingly against his gut instincts, acquiesced with the game plan
choreographed in Washington. He knows Bhutto is a complex personality.
But he also knows she has influential supporters, like US ambassador
to the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, whose antipathies toward
Musharraf date to his posting in Kabul.
All the same,
within the fortnight since Bhutto's arrival in Pakistan from exile
on October 12, Musharraf has been proved right. The American blueprint
for Pakistan's democratic transformation became stuck in the mud.
It was so visible that all could see, especially when Bhutto began
trading charges that the establishment was conspiring to kill its
future prime minister, and the negotiations between the two sides
over fine-tuning their "deal" ground to a halt. The frustrations
deepened when Bhutto realized that she was virtually confined to
her Karachi home.
Ironically,
Musharraf found he could seize the high ground once it began to
dawn on Washington that its hare-brained plan to foist Bhutto atop
the political heap in Islamabad was simply unworkable. Plainly put,
Bhutto was not acceptable to the Pakistani establishment. Washington
had no "Plan B", either.
Musharraf's
agenda
Musharraf struck fast.
Now that he has "liberated" himself from the political
burden that Washington expected him to carry, he feels free to act
on his own terms. This means first and foremost that he will hold
both the offices of president and chief of army staff, at least
until the elections, whenever they are held (the January date seems
unlikely now). He will in all probability expect a new Supreme Court
to endorse his re-election as president, which will enable him to
be sworn in for another term in office. Musharraf's overwhelming
win in last month's presidential polls has not yet been ratified
by the court.
Musharraf has
certainly sized up that Bhutto's political image has been badly
tarnished due to her controversial "deal" with him. It
will take a while for her to regain her credibility in popular opinion
within Pakistan. From Musharraf's point of view, therefore, in the
short term at least, she is virtually rendered ineffectual as a
rallying point of opposition, even assuming that she has the will
to act in such a role.
But he may well
keep a line of communication open to her. Who knows, he may still
have a need for her, but that is something for the future. More
important, Musharraf needs to factor that even after the present
setback, Washington and London may still not give up hope completely
regarding Bhutto's return to mainstream politics in Pakistan's leadership
structure. The sad reality is that there are no other credible figures
in the democratic opposition other than Bhutto who would be prepared
in today's circumstances to play according to the US script.
Meanwhile, Musharraf
has virtually decided to continue to rely on the present ruling
party, the Pakistan Muslim League, which has staunchly resisted
Bhutto's political accommodation. He has chosen not to upset the
apple cart. The intelligence agencies feel greatly relieved that
the judiciary has been cracked and the dark days of public accountability
are over.
Musharraf continues
to rely on the resourceful, crafty Choudhury clan for holding fort
in Punjab, the heartland of Pakistani politics. His equations with
the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), the party of the "Mohajirs"
(migrants from India at the time of the partition in 1947), remain
intact. MQM leader Altaf Hussain, who lives in exile in London,
has mildly distanced himself from the imposition of emergency rule
in Pakistan, but he pointedly drew attention to the "reasons"
behind Musharraf's decision. Hussain said sections of the judiciary,
the legal fraternity and the media exceeded their "rights,
traditions and etiquettes".
The MQM's support
for the regime is important for Musharraf. It ensures that Pakistan's
most populous city of Karachi takes the imposition of emergency
in its stride. Again, it is highly possible that some elements of
the Islamic parties, such as the Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam of Maulana
Fazlur Rehman will be co-opted in the coming weeks. Rehman is a
valuable link with the militant Islamist camp. The regime has also
assessed that former prime minister Nawaz Sharif's return to Pakistan
can be endlessly stalled in the new circumstances with a pliant
judiciary.
All in all,
the chances of an eruption of popular agitation under the leadership
of the democratic opposition are almost nil in immediate terms.
This is despite the fact that the reasons advanced by Musharraf
for imposing emergency rule lack credibility. He can now count on
the intelligence agencies to play their traditional role of manipulating
a coalition of political forces that will steer the regime successfully
past the next parliamentary elections. Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz
has hinted elections are unlikely for another year. Musharraf is
evidently planning for the long haul.
Who has the
last laugh?
When the epitaph of the
Bush era in Pakistan's contemporary history finally gets to be written
in a year's time, there will be a complex, engrossing story to tell.
Bush began reasonably well in 2001 by threatening to bomb the daylight
out of Pakistan and to dispatch that country to the Stone Age. His
threat of shock and awe indeed worked. Musharraf quickly fell in
line in the "war on terror". The world community applauded
Bush. But in the process, Musharraf ensured his regime gained international
legitimacy.
Also, Musharraf
promptly put a price tag on Pakistan's role in the "war on
terror". He negotiated hard. And he extracted out of the Bush
administration in bits and pieces over the past six years a staggering
amount of US$10 billion as assistance. That kept the Pakistani economy
going, the army well equipped and his support base intact.
Of course, he
took care to endear himself and the Pakistan army as an indispensable
ally to Bush. As time passed, like a skilful commando, he began
walking a fine line - in and out of the "war on terror"
- almost unnoticed, as he pleased. Certainly, Bush noticed but had
to pretend he didn't. There was no other option. Bush was preoccupied
in Iraq, and Musharraf knew that as well.
In fact, Bush,
who once saw Russia's President Vladimir Putin's soul in his deep
blue eyes and liked it, has no choice but to keep insisting he is
on a "hunt" with Musharraf in the Hindu Kush. Now, with
a much-weakened Bush presidency almost entering a lame-duck phase,
it is only natural that Musharraf feels he must look ahead. He will
know by now as well as anyone that his number one public liability
within Pakistan is his close association with the George W Bush
presidency.
But continued
US backing remains vital for Musharraf's regime. How he reconciles
the conflicting interests remains to be seen. One thing is for sure.
None of Pakistan's previous military dictators had such mastery
over the art of the possible.
M K Bhadrakumar
served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over
29 years, with postings including India's ambassador to Uzbekistan
(1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).
|
