We do not intend to be fear mongers. Pakistan's officer corps and ruling elites remain largely moderate and more interested in building a strong, modern state than in exporting terrorism or nuclear weapons to the highest bidder. But then again, Americans felt similarly about the shah's regime in Iran until it was too late.

Moreover, Pakistan's intelligence services contain enough sympathizers and supporters of the Afghan Taliban, and enough nationalists bent on seizing the disputed province of Kashmir from India, that there are grounds for real worries.

The most likely possible dangers are these: a complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which the minority sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism.

All possible military initiatives to avoid those possibilities are daunting. With 160 million people, Pakistan is more than five times the size of Iraq. It would take a long time to move large numbers of American forces halfway across the world. And unless we had precise information about the location of all of Pakistan's nuclear weapons and materials, we could not rely on bombing or using Special Forces to destroy them.

The task of stabilizing a collapsed Pakistan is beyond the means of the United States and its allies. Rule-of-thumb estimates suggest that a force of more than a million troops would be required for a country of this size. Thus, if we have any hope of success, we would have to act before a complete government collapse, and we would need the cooperation of moderate Pakistani forces.

One possible plan would be a Special Forces operation with the limited goal of preventing Pakistan's nuclear materials and warheads from getting into the wrong hands. Given the degree to which Pakistani nationalists cherish these assets, it is unlikely the United States would get permission to destroy them. Somehow, American forces would have to team with Pakistanis to secure critical sites and possibly to move the material to a safer place.

For the United States, the safest bet would be shipping the material to someplace like New Mexico; but even pro-American Pakistanis would be unlikely to cooperate. More likely, we would have to settle for establishing a remote redoubt within Pakistan, with the nuclear technology guarded by elite Pakistani forces backed up (and watched over) by crack international troops. It is realistic to think that such a mission might be undertaken within days of a decision to act. The price for rapid action and secrecy, however, would probably be a very small international coalition.

A second, broader option would involve supporting the core of the Pakistani armed forces as they sought to hold the country together in the face of an ineffective government, seceding border regions and Al Qaeda and Taliban assassination attempts against the leadership. This would require a sizable combat force — not only from the United States, but ideally also other Western powers and moderate Muslim nations.

Even if we were not so committed in Iraq and Afghanistan, Western powers would need months to get the troops there. Fortunately, given the longstanding effectiveness of Pakistan's security forces, any process of state decline probably would be gradual, giving us the time to act.

So, if we got a large number of troops into the country, what would they do? The most likely directive would be to help Pakistan's military and security forces hold the country's center — primarily the region around the capital, Islamabad, and the populous areas like Punjab Province to its south.

We would also have to be wary of internecine warfare within the Pakistani security forces. Pro-American moderates could well win a fight against extremist sympathizers on their own. But they might need help if splinter forces or radical Islamists took control of parts of the country containing crucial nuclear materials. The task of retaking any such regions and reclaiming custody of any nuclear weapons would be a priority for our troops.

If a holding operation in the nation's center was successful, we would probably then seek to establish order in the parts of Pakistan where extremists operate. Beyond propping up the state, this would benefit American efforts in Afghanistan by depriving terrorists of the sanctuaries they have long enjoyed in Pakistan's tribal and frontier regions.

The great paradox of the post-cold war world is that we are both safer, day to day, and in greater peril than before. There was a time when volatility in places like Pakistan was mostly a humanitarian worry; today it is as much a threat to our basic security as Soviet tanks once were. We must be militarily and diplomatically prepared to keep ourselves safe in such a world. Pakistan may be the next big test.

Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.

So the general is trying to oblige. He has declared that elections will now go ahead in January. He has, thankfully, begun to release some of those locked up under martial law. On Friday, the government ended the house arrest of Asma Jahangir, a leading lawyer.

More concessions can be expected. Gen Musharraf may finally decide to heed a longstanding opposition demand – reiterated by President George W. Bush – that he "take off the uniform". This means that if he insists on serving another term as president it will be as a civilian ruler rather than as a military man. At some point before the elections in January, the Pakistani government may ease its restrictions on the media. The government will also be under pressure to lift martial law completely. It is impossible to see how anybody can pronounce the magic words, "free and fair", if elections are conducted under emergency rule and boycotted by the main opposition parties.

Yet even if Gen Musharraf does all of that, there is another test that should be insisted on by those who are serious about democracy in Pakistan. Gen Musharraf must respect the independence of the judiciary and, in particular, the Supreme Court.

The origins of the current crisis lie in the clash earlier this year between the general and Iftikhar Chaudhary, the court's chief justice. Gen Musharraf's decision to impose emergency rule this month was almost certainly provoked by a fear that the Supreme Court would rule that his recent re-election as president was illegal. In effect, Gen Musharraf sacked the Supreme Court before it could sack him.

Since then the president has set about appointing a new, more pliant Supreme Court. The freshly appointed judges will be expected to rubber-stamp his new presidential term and the next parliamentary elections. But no country can be called truly democratic with a puppet judiciary. The outside world should remind Gen Musharraf of this fundamental point.

Gen. Pervez Musharraf seized power in Pakistan eight years ago, claiming that the army had to step in to save the country from corrupt and incompetent politicians. Since then, he has run both the army and the government himself, with the connivance of a rubber-stamp Parliament put in place through rigged elections. His rule has proved to be a dismal failure, creating more problems than those it set out to solve.

Earlier this month, with opposition to his regime growing and the courts about to rule that he could not legally be president, Musharraf chose to suspend the constitution and impose emergency rule. He dismissed the Supreme Court and arrested the judges, replacing them with judges who will bend to his will. He blocked all independent television channels and threatened to punish the news media if it disparaged him or the army. His police arrested thousands of lawyers and pro-democracy activists. He ordered that civilians be tried in closed military courts. This is what is necessary, he said, to save Pakistan from a rapidly growing Islamist insurgency.

But no one should believe him.

It is true that over the last decade Islamist militants -- Pakistani Taliban nurtured in madrasas along the Afghan border -- have grown stronger and widened their reach. Each day brings news that the government's security forces have surrendered to Taliban fighters without firing a shot. Flaunting its strength, the Taliban has released many of these soldiers -- and even paid their way home. Other prisoners, especially Shiites, have been beheaded and their corpses mutilated.

Musharraf's government and his army have been woefully unsuccessful at handling this insurgency. They have lost control in many areas bordering Afghanistan and in the North-West Frontier Province. Earlier this month, the militants took over a third town in the Swat valley, only half a day's ride from the capital, Islamabad, while others captured the Pakistan-Austria Training Institute for Hotel Management in Charbagh.

Across the country, Islamists have taken over public buildings, forced local government officials to flee and promised to bring law and order. A widely available Taliban-made video shows the bodies of criminals dangling from electricity poles in the town of Miranshah, the administrative headquarters of North Waziristan.

The militants have even made their first major foray into the capital. From January to July of this year, the government allowed heavily armed extremists sympathetic to Al Qaeda and the Taliban to freely function out of Islamabad's Red Mosque. It is less than two miles from Musharraf's official residence at President House, from parliament and from the much-vaunted Inter-Services Intelligence headquarters. But the authorities were nowhere to be seen as armed vice-and-virtue squads sent out by the Islamists kidnapped prostitutes, burned CDs and videos, forced women to wear burkas and demanded that city laws be bent to their will. The government sent in clerics and politicians sympathetic to the militants as negotiators, and made one concession after another.

Amid growing public and international demands to act, Musharraf finally sent in special troops. The military action turned Islamabad into a war zone. When the smoke from rocket-propelled grenades and heavy machine guns had cleared, more than 117 people (the official count) were dead, many of them girls from a neighboring seminary. Mullahs promised revenge, and it began shortly afterward in a wave of suicide bombings across the country that has claimed hundreds of lives.

Why has Musharraf failed so dramatically to stop the insurgency? One reason is that most of the public is hostile to government action against the extremists (and the rest offer tepid support at best). Most Pakistanis see the militants as America's enemy, not their own. The Taliban is perceived as the only group standing up against the unwelcome American presence in the region. Some forgive the Taliban's excesses because it is cloaked in the garb of religion. Pakistan, they reason, was created for Islam, and the Taliban is merely asking for Pakistan to be more Islamic.

Even normally vocal, urban, educated Pakistanis -- those whose values and lifestyles would make them eligible for decapitation if the Taliban were to succeed in taking the cities -- are strangely silent. Why? Because they see Musharraf and the Pakistan army as unworthy of support, both for blocking the path to democracy and for secretly supporting the Taliban as a means of countering Indian influence in Afghanistan.

There is merit to this view. Army rule for 30 of Pakistan's 60 years as a country has left a terrible legacy. The army is huge, well-equipped, armed now with nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and has perhaps the world's richest generals. Sitting or retired army officers govern provinces, run government agencies, administer universities, manage banks and make breakfast cereals.

Military rule has also created a class of dependent politicians who understand that cutting a deal with the army is the passage to power. For them, public office is an opportunity not to govern but to gain privilege and wealth for themselves, their relatives and their friends. Meanwhile, barely half of Pakistan's people can read and write, and one-third live below the poverty line.

The ties between the military and the Islamic militants are also well known. For more than 25 years, the army has nurtured Islamist radicals as proxy warriors for covert operations on Pakistan's borders in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Various army chiefs honed a strategy that juggled their relationship with the U.S. against the demands of local intelligence chiefs, and of mullahs, tribal leaders, politicians and fortune seekers who have contacts with the militants. Radical groups are encouraged. As they grow and start to slip out of control, these groups are tolerated and appeased to keep them loyal. When interests inevitably clash, a military crackdown follows. The innocent are caught in the crossfire.

If Pakistan is to fight and win the war against the Taliban, it will need to mobilize both its people and the state. Musharraf's recent declaration of emergency will only make this much harder.

In the short term, Pakistan's current political crisis may be managed by having Musharraf resign -- both as president and as head of the army. And before he does so, he must also restore the judiciary and constitution, lift the curbs on the media, free all political prisoners and set up a caretaker government. These are the necessary conditions for holding free and fair elections.

Credibility of elections requires that former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif -- whatever one might think of their personal integrity -- both be included among the contestants. Bhutto loudly announced in Washington that she will take on Al Qaeda and the Taliban as her first priority, whereas Sharif is closer to the Islamic parties. But, as their past tenures suggest, if elected, realpolitik will force both to act similarly.

Only a freely chosen and representative government can win public support for taking on the Taliban. But to do this, it will need to begin addressing the larger, long-term political, social and economic problems facing Pakistan. The country must seek a more normal relationship with India. Only then can the army be cut down to size and Pakistan free itself from the massive military expenditures and the nuclear weapons that burden it. It must address the grievous regional inequalities that feed resentment against Islamabad. The government must push to provide basic needs and sustainable livelihoods to the rural and urban poor. It must offer people hope.

Pervez Hoodbhoy teaches at Quaid-e-Azam University in Islamabad.

They say frequent military interventions and destabilization of elected governments have given "rise to indiscipline, disorder, unemployment, massive corruption, intolerance, and extremism in Pakistan, which must be eradicated and eliminated with iron hands".

These judges who had refused to take oath under the PCO, have also observed in their joint judgment, which has not been released to the media, that continuation of Musharraf as the army chief beyond December 31, 2004 was "illegal and unlawful".

The judges, Justice Rana Bhagwandas, Justice Sardar Mohammad Raza Khan and Mian Shakirullah Jan, were part of the nine-member bench which had dismissed the petitions of Qazi Hussain Ahmed and Imran Khan on September 28, 2007 with regard to the question whether Musharraf could contest election from the present assemblies with or without uniform.

The judges submitted their detailed judgment to the Supreme Court on Friday in which they have addressed seven questions that were raised before the court. Talking to The News, Justice Rana Bhagwandas who headed the bench, confirmed that he along with Justice Sardar Mohammad Raza and Mian Shakirullah had submitted their judgment last Friday but the authorities may not have released their 58-page long observations.

Justice Bhagwandas who was in good spirits and in a defiant mood told this correspondent they had taken a lot of time and effort to put together the arguments to establish their points of view. The SC should have made their judgment public.

But, he said, it was not done. He observed that his staff might have handed over the judgment to the concerned authorities for its release to the media, but it was simply dumped and ignored. "These are very important observations and everybody should come to know about those points on the basis of which we had decided the issue of eligibility and merit."

In the judgment spread over 58 pages, the three judges have observed that "we earnestly feel that this country no longer can afford the luxury of resorting to circumvent the law and the constitu tional mandate by upholding and affirming the draconian doctrine of necessity restored to earlier.

Indeed, the judges of this court are under an oath to uphold, preserve and defend the constitution of Pakistan, which must be strictly adhered to in letter and spirit without any fear or favour, or ill will.

"Any endeavor to continue and affirm the present system of governance, which has transformed parliamentary system of governance into presidential form of government is bound to damage the dignity, respect and honour of the citizen of this country in the comity of the nations and bring a bad name to it, which can hardly be appreciated.

"Independence of judiciary, stability of the democratic system, regular conduct of the general election process, allowing the institutions to serve freely within the sphere of their scope and without involvement of the armed would always be in the supreme interests of the nation.

They said: "Needless to emphasis, frequent military interventions and destabilization of elected governments have always given rise to indiscipline, disorder, conflict of interests, inflation, unemployment, massive corruption, intolerance and extremism in the country which must be eradicated and eliminated with iron hand and strengthen in accordance with the law".

In the same judgment the judges have also observed "we earnestly feel, there appears to be enough substance and force in the submission of the petitioners that General Musharraf could not contest elections from the current assemblies as outgoing assemblies can not be allowed to bind the successor assemblies to be elected as a result of popular mandate. Further more, members of present electoral college, who have already expressed their opinion by expressing a vote of confidence immediately after their assumption of office, may not be in a position to exercise their right of franchise freely and independently. They would naturally be influenced and swayed by their earlier decision.

"Since the term of the office of President as well the present assembly expires simultaneously on November 15, 2007, it would be in the fitness of the things and in consonance with the democratic norms and intentions of the framers of the constitution if the new assemblies and the electoral college are allowed to exercise their right to elect a president of their choice during the term of electoral college under the constitution.

"An exceptional situation which can be conceived may be where the incumbent president, before expiration of his term of office, is removed from his office on the ground of physical or mental incapacity, is impeached on a charge of violating the constitution or the gross misconduct; resignation or death when the office of president falls vacant, the existing electoral college would be constitutionally authorized to elect another president for the un expired term of office.

"Indeed, General Musharraf, was fully alive to this situation, therefore while promulgating LFO 2002, he introduced meaningful amendments in the Chief Executive order, he introduced meaningful amendments in article 224 of the constitution, providing for time for election bye election. While the original text provided that a general election to the national assembly or a provincial assembly shall be held within a period of 60 days immediately "preceding" the day on which the term of assembly is due to expire, the expression "preceding" was intentionally substituted by the term "following".

"This amendment was intentionally and deliberately made with a view to make a room for a seeking election to the office of the president from the outgoing assemblies in conformity with clause (4) of article 41 of the constitution stipulating that election to the office shall be held not earlier than 60 days and not later than 30 days before the expiration of the term of the president in office. The draftsmanship and ingenuity of those who suggested the above said amendment in the constitutional provisions can only cause dismay may be looked upon with sorrow and grief".

"Since the purpose and object of the amendments never saw the light of the day, it is hard to appreciate the ground realities providing the forum to present electoral college for election of the same person to the office president for another tem for which new assemblies have to be elected a as a result of popular vote based upon election manifestoes of various political parties.

"It may be further observed that the president being an integral part of the parliament, it would be quite inconceivable and unusual that the parliament with whom a president has to work in total cordiality and harmony should not be elected by such parliament.

"At the cost of repetition, it may be noted that a parliament having outlived its tenure should not be allowed to bind the successor parliament with its choice as it is well settled that a parliament may do anything but bind the successor parliament. The present parliament having outlived its life, in our view, does not have a democratic mandate of the people to elect the same person as president for another term of five years, which would militate against the well entrenched principles of democratic value".

"For the aforesaid facts, circumstances and reasons these petitions are allowed and General Pervez Musharraf declared to be disqualified to contest for the presidential election," the three judges concluded.