Asghar Khan This is an excerpt from the writer's book "My Political Struggle" published by Oxford University Press. He is a retired air chief and veteran politician.Taken from History of Northern...
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AFP
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October 10, 2010
Asghar Khan This is an excerpt from the writer's book "My Political Struggle" published by Oxford University Press. He is a retired air chief and veteran politician.
Taken from History of Northern Areas of Pakistan, by Dr A H Dani: Col Pasha's first arrival in Gilgit on Nov 30, 1947, by plane was to assess the local situation and to provide, first of all, a military base for the execution of authority by the Political Agent. In view of the tussle between the commanders of the Jammu and Kashmir State Battalion here and the British commandant of the Gilgit Scouts, Maj William Brown, as we read in the different versions of Col Hasan Khan and in the diary of Lt Col Ghulam Haider, the position was not easy to handle.
This had become still more complicated because of the arrest of two senior officers of the state force--Lt Col Abdul Majeed Khan and Maj Ehsan Ali. The British commandant had high aspirations. It is quite possible that to improve his position he had left for Peshawar by plane on Nov 26, 1947. When Col Pasha arrived, he had the immediate object of raising an Azad force from Gilgit. With this end in view, he met all the JCOs of the Scouts, Col Hasan Khan, Maj Ehsan Ali and Lt Col Abdul Majeed Khan.
Various reasons are given to explain why Majeed withheld his hand of cooperation, but Maj Ehsan quickly came forward to lend all his support. Col Pasha was determined to mobilise all available personnel in Gilgit, discuss plans with them and push forward his scheme of launching an offensive. One proposal was to send Maj Ehsan to Ladakh. He then suggested an advance towards Gurez for raids on Bandipur. But before any action of advance could be undertaken, firm preparation was necessary.
With these ideas, Col Pasha returned to General Headquarters in Rawalpindi on Dec 3, 1947. But before returning two decisions were taken: first, the two British officers (Maj Brown and Capt Matheison) would be sent back when Col Pasha would resume his full responsibility and, second, Col Hasan Khan was sent to Chilas on military duty. Maj Brown returned on Dec 8, 1947, with no further promotion for himself, but only orders for increase of 500 more recruits in Scouts and Commission for Subedar Major Mohammad Babar Khan.
Brown's dissatisfaction, in spite of his own advertising about the service for the freedom struggle, led to acrimony and a fight between him and Lt Col Ghulam Haider Khan, as we read hereafter in the latter's diary, and the situation did not improve until the removal of the two British officers in January 1948, when Col Pasha returned and resumed command of the combined force in Gilgit.
As he recounts, he asked for material help from the General Headquarters. He could get only a sum of four thousand rupees from Maj Gen Sher Khan. Half of this sum he spent in purchasing blankets and old clothes at Raja Bazar, Rawalpindi, which were dropped by plane in Bunji. With him came his younger brother, Maj Anwar, who was made brigader major here, and Capt Azmat Ali appointed as DQ for general administration. Another brother. Wing Commander (later Air Marshal) Asghar Khan, then in charge of Risalpur Training School, started surveying Chilas and other areas as far back as Dec 9, 1947. It is this survey which led to droppings of material by using Dakota, Halifax and, finally, Harvard planes.
Back in Gilgit, where Col Pasha established his headquarter, he raised the strength of the combined force to about 2,000 men, equipped them with whatever arms that were captured from the Kashmir State force and trained the rest with dummy wooden rifles. The plan that Col Pasha made covered the immediate objective--to advance into the blank area and occupy as much territory as possible during the winter before the enemy had the chance to re-enter; to hold the enemy at the two passes at the south-east and south-west and stop their passage with strong force, so that in the next summer season there was no possibility of the enemy retaking possession of the ground so conquered; and finally to neutralise the enemy's strength in Skardu and conquer the whole of Baltistan and integrate it into the Northern Areas.
The entire plan, as it appears, covered those "frontier" areas which fell outside the main valley of Kashmir and Jammu. Col Pasha could hardly hope to invade Kashmir from this northerly direction as he had no means to do so. If he could hold Zojila pass, the only other direction where he could advance was Ladakh and cut it away from Jammu and Kashmir.
This aim of conquering Baltistan and pushing the border to the very gates of Kashmir was a scheme of no mean order and this perhaps was the mission for which he was sent to Gilgit. Col Pasha was a man of steel frame to achieve his objective in the most unfavourable season of the year.