Rehab for terrorists in Pakistan

In its war against terrorism, Pakistan has been successful on many counts. But a complete victory is still not within sight. What the military assault lacks is a holistic combat strategy, made up of both hard and soft measures.

Hard power measures are strictly military or law enforcement techniques, which include the use of force to kill, capture and detain terrorists. The soft wartime initiatives, on the other hand, seek to roll back the appeal of extremist ideologies and help individuals reintegrate into society.

Both are important, for a long-term solution to terrorism. And both need to be employed together.

The first chatter in Pakistan of resorting to soft measures emerged in late 2003, when the Army launched an assault in the remote Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The operation culminated in a peace agreement with militant commander Nek Muhammad. Thereon, a mantra of truce talks with the terrorists began to dominate public discourse.

In the lead up to the 2013 election, both the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf had highlighted peace talks with the Taliban as a key roadmap to eliminate militancy. This narrative only changed in December 2014, after a brutal terror attack killed over 100 schoolchildren in Peshawar.

But this year again, the question of how to rehabilitate captured terrorists and flush out militancy is gaining momentum, after reports surfaced that Jamaat-ud-Daawa– an under observation group – is planning to enter the mainstream political domain. Later, a video confession of Ehsanullah Ehsan, the surrendered spokesperson of the Pakistani Taliban, was broadcasted on local media. This gave a new twist to the pressing issue of what to do with hardened militants.

For commentators, soft measure means de-radicalization, counter-radicalization, reconciliation, demobilisation, disengagement and mainstreaming. Of these, three approaches are the most popular around the world. First is a multi-layered de-radicalization approach, adopted by Western countries. These countries have developed de-radicalization strategies, which range from engagement to winning the hearts and minds of the Muslim immigrant communities. The main objective here is to neutralise security threats. Thus, security institutions, such as the police, lead these programs. Besides the West, some predominately Muslim countries, mainly Saudi Arabia, are also pursuing this strategy to grapple with homegrown terrorism.

The second approach looks at developing effective counter-narratives. Here, religious scholars play a pivotal role. Such programs engage religious scholars on two levels: first, in programs meant to de-radicalize the terrorist detainees; and second, in programs of intellectual effort meant to counter the religious arguments of extremists. Case in point is Morocco, which launched an extensive religious reform program following the 2003 and 2007 bombings in Casablanca.

The third approach concentrates on reintegration of the vulnerable communities. Algeria’s reintegration program is an example of such an approach, built upon two referenda, one in 1999 and the second in 2005, which led to the production of the Civil Concorde Law and the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. This program revolves around certain measures of achieving peace, such as pardons, amnesties, reduction in sentence, and dropping of charges against those who renounce violence and surrender their weapons in exchange for forgiveness.

Back in Pakistan, no one approach can do the war justice. Since the 1980s, to date, the country has developed a diverse militant landscape. To tackle it, it needs a multifold framework, which includes the following components:

1. Rehabilitation of detainees: Pakistan already has a few rehabilitation centres. Initially, these centres were established in Swat. The centres run three programs – Sabaoon with focus on juveniles, Mishal, concentrates on adult detainees, and Sparlay, which deals with the family members of the detained persons. The rehabilitation efforts are further divided into modules, including an education module, psychological counselling and therapy and vocational training.

Dr. Muhammad Farooq Khan, a leading religious scholar, was one of those who helped develop the Sabaoon program. In it, he ensured, were counter-arguments to confront extremist points of view. Khan was assassinated in 2010. This was a major setback for the centre, which is struggling to this day to find an appropriate replacement.

2. Developing counter-narratives: A rational discourse can be built with the help of universities, think tanks and civil society organisations.

3. Reintegration of the militants: There are certain groups, which have potential to disengage from militancy if the state initiates some serious and comprehensive measures. For this, the parliament can constitute a national level truth and reconciliation commission to review the policies that produced militancy and reintegrate those willing to shun violence.

Rana is a security and political analyst and the director of the Islamabad-based Pak Institute for Peace Studies