The fall and rise of the Taliban: Will history repeat itself?

The withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan had been a long time coming.

It was an inevitability people had been waiting upon for the past few years, one that imagined the superpower to have properly quashed the Taliban fighters and leave with efficiency.

But the execution was, unfortunately, far messier. The US withdrawal left a vacuum in power that the Taliban had been waiting to fill. Emboldened at what they considered a “victory”, they have managed to capture district after district swiftly since then.

A frightening similarity is realised in this - one that starkly resembles the way the Taliban had originally ousted control of Afghanistan in the power gap left behind post the Soviet withdrawal, at the tail end of the 1980s.

The parallels are uncanny and the story is almost circular in nature.

Back in the 80s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was where the seed was sown for all the future turmoil to come. When the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) ousted President Daoud Khan in the Saur revolution, they introduced an unpopular communist regime, though it never referred to itself as such and took steps to avoid the association.

The Pul-e-Charkhi Prison in Afghanistan quickly gained infamy, as the site for political violence and torture against those considered a danger against the PDPA and its ideologies, sometimes even culminating in executions as evidenced by the mass graves discovered several years later in the wasteland surrounding the prison.

When the unpopularity became intolerable to the public, the Soviet Union was obliged to help their comrades out in Afghanistan in order to stabilise their vulnerable neighbor, as the PDPA collapsing and leaving room for radical forces was an outcome undesirable for its borders.

And so, the Soviet invaded and found themselves face-to-face with the Afghan mujahedeen.

The Soviet invasion alarmed the entire world, most of all the US, which found this to be a grievous assault at the height of the Cold War and fell into supporting the mujahedeen in this proxy war, with the help of Pakistan, against their mutual enemy.

When the strategic advantages in terrain and foreign aid overwhelmed the Soviet’s sheer size and power, it withdrew leaving a gap for power to be vied for. At this point, the mujahedeen were extremely well-armed, radicalised factions, from among which rose the Taliban, inspired by their leader Mullah Mohammad Omar.

They enjoyed popularity in their earlier years for several reasons, such as that they were attributed with the exit of the Soviets and the Afghans felt areas were safer with them around.

When the Taliban managed to take Kandahar the first time in 1994, the strategic victory was considered the hopeful start of a new era even. But as the regime took a stronghold, people quickly realised the illusion of that hope.

The US considered Afghanistan a closed file given that they had accomplished their goal against the Soviet. That was, until 9/11, and all eyes were suddenly on Afghanistan and the Taliban once more for their affiliation with al-Qaeda. When the Taliban refused to cooperate, the war was declared less than a month later, and the Taliban was reduced to a mere insurgency.

In the coming years, the US did manage to accomplish their goals, but at the cost of adding fuel to the fire.

During the war, the civilians no longer had to simply endure suffering under the Taliban but also against the US military as well. The drone strikes overlooked civilian injuries and deaths, the torture of alleged conspirators, night raids, and extreme lack of accountability for all these flagrant violations of human rights at the hands of these foreigners led to an extreme lack of public support.

Some suffering under the U.S army, fuelled by hatred, looked once more to the insurgency for hope. It also led to a hostile political environment where dialogue focused, governance-oriented solutions became a futile possibility.

With the recent US withdrawal, what is left behind is another empty space everyone involved neglected to fill with a foundation for a trustworthy and well supported governance system.

The Taliban have taken full advantage of this as they did before. However, unlike the last time, they no longer have the privilege of being seen as saviours from a cruel regime. The Taliban are fully aware of this, and the recent attempts to frame themselves as a reformed, well-organised group ready to shoulder the responsibility of caring for Afghanistan, is a gross misrepresentation to allow the transition to power be seen as more acceptable to foreigners.

Underneath it all, it’s the same as before.

As refugees pour out of the country in a deluge, officials and diplomats flee, and thousands more look desperately for a way out, the fault lies again with a superpower making a casual exit after finding their endeavour has pushed past its own needs with no care for the people left behind.

This approach was how unstable and dangerous regimes were founded in Afghanistan earlier, and it is startling how this is now being allowed to happen once again after the disastrous consequences of the Soviet war, with a complete disregard of what this will spell out not only for the Afghans but for their immediate neighbours, and the morale of religious extremists across the globe, which will inevitably include the West, but not before it has devastated the third world nations that struggle with this type of extremism the most.

In the end, it will be this response to the new Taliban, clamouring to rule over Afghanistan once more, that will be the clearest statement on what the future will be coming forward.

As developments continue, we can only hope this will be the final lesson in history of how irresponsible foreign interventions ruin the lives of those who have to bear the brunt of it, and inevitably sours the rest of the world too.

Fatima Zahid is a researcher at the Islamabad-based Center for Law and Security