What next for Balochistan?

If images depict the state of the nation, two stand out. One from Gwadar where thousands of women look to be in a determined sit-in. This despite the sad stories of both protesters and soldiers having lost lives on the way to the port city.

The other image is from the Paris Olympics where instead of Pakistani athletes, we see a not-too-athletic government minister posing for selfies. Reports are that he is leading a delegation of 11 officials to manage seven invisible athletes.

Both have stories to tell of a state in disarray. Both are tragic in their own way. It would be fair to say that there can be no comparison between one example, in which lives are being lost every day and the other that just shows venal exploitation by the elite.

True, blood draws lines in the sand that are difficult to erase. The anguish it leaves hardens resolve and makes a settlement more difficult. Elite misbehaviour on the other hand is commonplace. While evoking anger, how much of a lasting damage does it leave?

In the collective consciousness of the nation, it does. It shows a state not in control, a state in which priorities are wrong and decision-making flawed. Obviously, the emotional turmoil of lives lost is a thousand times greater but both images are consequences of a mindset that refuses to bend, refuses to take heed of realities.

Balochistan has been festering for a long time. Some would say right from the start when the new Pakistani state used the threat of force to make the Khan of Kalat accede to it. Armed insurgencies erupted during the Bhutto period but were contained after Zia came in. Baloch tribesmen who had retreated to the mountains, to fight, or gone to Afghanistan, returned home.

After a relatively quiet period — almost three decades — things came to a head with the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti. It was obvious immediately to everyone that this was not going to be a small event, easily forgotten. Writing in this paper in August 2006 I said, “Nawab Akbar Bugti’s death has the potential to be a defining moment in the history of this country. He was no angel and his Baloch nationalist credentials are open to question but it is such an outrageous act that it has shocked friend and foe alike. More importantly, it has crystallised the hurt and anger that people of smaller provinces feel against an overbearing and despotic centre”.

Sadly, what most people felt then has turned out to be true. His fight with the Musharraf government had largely been about a share in royalties of gas that came out of Sui, a place in his tribal jurisdiction. He was leading no nationalist outpouring. In fact, as a governor of the province during the Bhutto period, he was seen by Baloch activists as a part of the other side. All of a sudden, this arrogant tribal chief, this autocratic anti-people feudal, became the centre point, the nucleus of Baloch nationalist aspirations.

Things have not really settled down since then. The one big difference between conflicts in the earlier years of Pakistan and today is that Baloch aspirations are no longer being articulated by tribal chiefs. The torch has passed to the people in the true sense. Activists like Dr Mahrang Baloch have no "royal" lineage. They are children of circumstance and have emerged from the people.

The old Balochistan elite have all been co-opted by the state in one form or another. A Bugti is a CM of the province (albeit from a section of the tribe opposed to Akbar Bugti); Marris, Mengals, Raisanis, Bizenjos, Magsis and many more tribal heads have all been part of one Balochistan government or another.

This has been in line with the state's analysis of the situation. The feeling was that Balochistan’s difficulties would die down if the tribal elite of Balochistan was incorporated into the government and given some — not too much — power. As a part of this bargain. and learning from the Bugti episode, huge sums of money have also been transferred to Balochistan for "development".

The elites have done what elites often do: looked after their interest first with some trickle down to their base but not much. The funds allocated have been fairly large — despite efforts, one has not been able to get precise figures for the last ten years — but little doubt that they have been substantial relative to the population of the province. However, sadly there is little in the way of development to show for all this investment. Money has gone, leaving little trace behind.

One part of the conclusions arrived at by the state has given some dividends. The areas controlled by co-opted tribal chiefs have been relatively quiet. The earlier insurgencies were largely in the Marri area and some in Mengal territory. No longer. One of the Marris has absconded to Switzerland and is in cahoots with the Indians but his impact on the ground is minimal.

Three new elements have come in a big way to make things complicated in Balochistan. First is the social change that has been brought about by more education and access to social media. This has reduced the influence of traditional power elites in the province and brought in what could be called middle-class leadership without any strong tribal ties. Is it a surprise that the most active conflict is seen in southern Balochistan, in Turbat, Panjgur and the coastal areas. Here there is little or no tribal identity and very few traces of feudalism.

The second complicating factor is the involvement of India in particular, and maybe some others too, in Balochistan. Besides stoking local grievances, their main target is Gwadar because of the Chinese presence there. This has made the challenge greater because this ties in with a global conflict of which we are not and don't want to be a part.

The third factor does not relate to the ethnic Baloch but is beginning to become a problem. It is the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) presence in northern Pashtun districts. It may not yet be a serious headache, but it means the diversion of manpower and resources away from the main conflict areas.

What is the way ahead? We have to find a solution to this festering problem of alienation in Balochistan because our survival as a nation depends on it. Despite years of effort, it refuses to go away and gives our enemies a chance to make serious difficulties for us.

We have to begin by going beyond the traditional elite and engaging with the newly emerging middle-class leadership of Balochistan, which should not be seen as adversaries or enemies but as future partners. Their grievances should be addressed particularly with regard to missing persons. Building a relationship of trust with this new leadership is a must.

Second, the allocation of funds should not stop at the provincial level. Local governments should be created and money transferred directly to them for development. The state has to build a relationship with the people and demonstrate its commitment to the improvement of their lives. This can only be done by direct engagement.

Much more needs to be done but to begin with, these two steps, if properly executed, could have a lasting impact. Even these will require a strong will to overcome the resistance that any change brings.

The writer served as the federal minister of education in the PTI’s federal government. He can be reached at: [email protected]

Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer's own and don't necessarily reflect Geo.tv's editorial policy.

Originally published in The News