Tackling the BLA

Balochistan has undergone profound sociological, demographic, political changes since last wave of militancy

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Pakistan army soldiers stand at a tunnel where the Jaffar Express train was attacked by militants, in Bolan, Balochistan, on March 15, 2025. — Reuters
Pakistan army soldiers stand at a tunnel where the Jaffar Express train was attacked by militants, in Bolan, Balochistan, on March 15, 2025. — Reuters

Balochi Yalghar is a symbol of the intrepid Baloch temperament, proudly displayed on the crests of silverware and paintings in regimental messes, celebrating the indomitable Baloch warrior spirit.

What has caused a variant of this Yalghar to turn against the state? Why is ethno-linguistic particularism gaining traction in Balochistan, and why have attacks on civilian and military targets taken on a new virulence? Is there a path to sustainable peace in Balochistan, and what socio-economic conditions and political grievances are fuelling the current militancy?

To analyse the multidimensional challenges that plague the governance and security landscape of Pakistan's largest province, one must acknowledge present realities rather than rely on outdated explanations for past violence and unrest. Balochistan has undergone profound sociological, demographic and political changes since the last wave of militancy in the early 2000s. Without understanding these shifts, no superficial solutions or token recommendations will lead to sustainable peace.

A defining feature of Balochistan’s current sociological landscape is the rise of an educated middle class, largely comprising young people under 30 who have been exposed to the world through the internet and social media. Scholars like Jonathan Haidt argue that such groups are becoming increasingly “fragilised” due to the psycho-social stresses induced by excessive social media use. This educated middle class is hypersensitive and deeply frustrated by the lack of job opportunities, pervasive corruption, and stalled development.

The political elite, primarily composed of tribal leaders, has treated governance like a game of musical chairs — rotating power among themselves without changing the underlying system. Every provincial government has worked to consolidate power, enriching its own members. In the past, there have been grotesque spectacles where the entire provincial legislature consisted of ministers, all feeding off public resources. Bad governance, corruption and the failure to deliver basic services fuel public anger, which the devious political elite cleverly redirects toward the state.

The entrenched tribal and political power structures in Balochistan have created a lasting divide between the people and the state. Tribal leaders enter politics to enjoy power, and when out of office, they fuel sub-nationalist narratives, presenting themselves as victims of establishment injustice. Following the 18th Amendment, most financial and administrative powers have been devolved to the provinces. However, provincial governments have failed to further devolve authority to the local level. As a result, grassroots communities remain disempowered, with literacy, health and economic indicators alarmingly low compared to the rest of the country.

Politically and administratively, the province has been dealt a poor hand, caught between the outsized role of the state’s security apparatus and the selfish interests of an extractive political elite. A common belief is that Balochistan would be better served if genuine leadership were allowed to emerge through elections. However, historical evidence challenges this notion. Since 1971, the province has witnessed fair elections — and yet each time, the resulting political leadership has remained tribal in nature, clinging to outdated governance styles and preserving entrenched feudal-tribal interests.

It is well-documented that tribal sardars have extracted heavy bribes from both the state and commercial entities like PPL to maintain their influence while keeping the people in poverty and bondage. Any political challenge to this tribal dominance by the educated middle class has been systematically suppressed, leading to deep-seated grievances and pent-up frustration. Whenever the military and bureaucratic establishment has attempted to support the middle class, the tribal leadership has decried it as political engineering.

Faced with the dilemma of maintaining political neutrality, the establishment was forced to retreat, leaving the arena open to both the middle class and tribal leadership. The resulting power struggle led to conflict and the rise of Baloch sub-nationalism, which the cunning extractive elite exploited to deflect the frustration of the Baloch people. A common enemy was identified in the military establishment — the only force capable of preventing armed conflict between the old tribal hierarchy and the emerging parvenu political elite.

On the geopolitical front, global power competition has encouraged sub-nationalist political entities to take up arms against what they perceive as a structure of iniquity, aiming to keep Balochistan destabilised. The objective has been to render economic initiatives like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) unviable through sustained violence in the region. Unfortunately, India has played a destabilising role in fomenting unrest, as evidenced by the arrest of serving Indian naval officer Kulbhushan Jhadav, who was operating a terrorist network in Balochistan.

The recent surge in BLA militancy is a direct consequence of Indian support and the availability of safe havens and logistical infrastructure in neighbouring countries. In Afghanistan, the Taliban government has contributed to this militancy by refusing to rein in terrorist entities like the BLA and TTP, which are forging operational linkages under the tacit approval of the Afghan interim government. These sociological, governance and geopolitical realities highlight the gravity of the security situation in Balochistan, which must be addressed with resolve, patience and political astuteness.

To combat BLA militancy, asymmetric warfare tactics should be employed, with intelligence and special forces leading the effort, supported by paramilitary and military components as a strategic backstop. The battle must be taken to the militants’ bases, with a particular focus on dismantling their support networks.

When the public witnesses the state’s determination, those on the fence will be more likely to align with the state, depriving the militants of the oxygen of public support.


The writer is a security and defence analyst. He can be reached at: [email protected]


Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed in this piece are the writer's own and don't necessarily reflect Geo.tv's editorial policy.

Originally published in The News